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ABSTRACT 
In light of recent political, legal, and legislative developments, 
the status of same-sex couples across the United States has become 
increasingly complex. This article focuses on the issue of same-sex 
divorce in a mobile society. When a same-sex couple moves from a 
state recognizing same-sex marriage—or from Canada—to a state that 
does not expressly recognize same-sex marriage, dissolution of that 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
* Professor Bohl teaches Children and the Law and Legal Research and Writing at 
Stetson University College of Law, Gulfport, Florida. She would like to thank Stetson 
student Matt Newton for his research help. His skillful research, efficiency, and 
professionalism brought the article to life. A short precursor of this piece appeared in 
the United Kingdom as part of The International Family Law Journal in May 2009. 
64 UNIVERSITY OF MIAMI RACE AND SOCIAL JUSTICE LAW REVIEW [Vol. 3 
marriage can become a byzantine problem much more complex than a 
state’s “official” position on same-sex marriage. Relevant factors can 
range from the state’s legislative and executive pronouncements 
affecting homosexual citizens in areas such as pension benefits and 
health plans to seemingly unrelated judicial decisions concerning other 
aspects of family law. This article examines this patchwork of factors 
and their implications. It ultimately concludes that the presence or 
absence of children may be the key factor, whether articulated or not, 
in judicial decisions regarding whether to open the courthouse doors to 
a same-sex couple. 
I. INTRODUCTION: MARRIAGE AND THE INVISIBLE 
GROUNDSWELL OF SAME-SEX COUPLES 
As recently as 1997, no state in the United States gave any legal 
recognition to same-sex relationships, much less allowed same-sex 
couples to marry.1 Now, twelve states permit same-sex marriage.2 
Though same-sex marriage was once condemned as a trend that could 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
 1. Edward Stein, Eulogy for ‘Marriage Evasion’ In Massachusetts: 1913-2008, 
HUFFINGTON POST (Aug. 1, 2008), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/edward-
stein/eulogy-for-marriage-evasi_b_116243.html. See also Defining Marriage: Defense 
of Marriage Acts and Same-Sex Marriage Laws, NAT’L CONF. OF ST. LEGISLATURES 
http://www.ncsl.org/programs/cyf/samesex.htm (last updated Nov. 2012). 
 2. Defining Marriage, supra note 2 (Connecticut, Delaware, Iowa, Maine, 
Maryland, Massachusetts, Minnesota, New Hampshire, New York, Rhode Island, 
Vermont, Washington, and the District of Columbia); Some valid, same-sex marriages 
exist in California, created during the window of time between the repeal of 
California’s DOMA and the passage of Proposition 8. See infra p. 10-11. Same-sex 
unions are also permitted in Washington, D.C. Marriage Equality and Other 
Relationship Recognition Laws, HUM. RTS. CAMPAIGN, 
 http://www.hrc.org/files/assets/resources/marriage_equality_laws_062013.pdf (last 
visited June 12, 2013). The California Supreme Court ruled on May 15, 2008 that 
same-sex couples have the right to marry under the state constitution, In re Marriage 
Cases, 183 P.3d 384 (Cal. 2008), and approximately 18,000 same-sex couples took 
advantage of this opportunity to wed. Proposition 8, which limits marriage to one man 
and one woman, was passed on November 4th, 2008. The California Supreme Court 
subsequently ruled that Proposition 8 was a valid amendment to the California 
Constitution, Strauss v. Horton, 207 P.3d 48 (Cal. 2009), but affirmed the validity of 
the same-sex marriages solemnized prior to the passage of Proposition 8. Later with a 
recent decision, Perry v. Brown, the United State’s Ninth Circuit has determined that 
Proposition 8 is unconstitutional. Perry v. Brown, 671 F.3d 1052 (9th Cir. 2012). The 
court declined to rehear the case on June 5, 2012. Id. A stay has been ordered on the 
judgment until further notice; presumably precluding same-sex marriages until the 
appeals process has been exhausted. Id. 
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destabilize the entire institution of marriage, 3  this view is in the 
minority today. 4  Some commentators consider the opportunity for 
same-sex couples to enter into marriage as a stabilizing influence in 
American society.5 Indeed, anecdotal data suggests that lesbians and 
gay men now entering adulthood have had the opportunity to be more 
open about their sexuality, and are correspondingly more interested in 
participating in traditional social institutions, such as marriage.6 
Certainly allowing same-sex couples to marry provides benefits 
and rights unavailable to them as an unmarried couple.7 Under typical 
state laws, marital benefits can include a range of property rights, 
including the right to own property as tenants by the entirety. Other 
rights include evidentiary rights, such as the right to prohibit one 
spouse from testifying against the other, and the right to bring suit for 
an injury to the relationship, such as a wrongful death claim or a loss of 
consortium claim.8 Marriage also confers intimate rights relating to end 
of life decisions.9 For example, a hospice patient’s “family” includes 
the spouse.10 A patient’s spouse determines whether life sustaining 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
 3. See, e.g., Lynne D. Wardle, The Curious Case of the Missing Legal Analysis, 18 
BYU J. PUB. L. 309 (2004); Steven W. Fitschen, Marriage Matters: A Case for A Get-
the-Job-Done-Right Federal Marriage Amendment, 83 N.D. L. REV. 1301 (2007). 
 4. Lydia Saad, Americans’ Acceptance of Gay Relations Crosses 50% Threshold, 
GALLUP (June 1, 2013), available at http://www.gallup.com/poll/135764/americans-
acceptance-gay-relations-crosses-threshold.aspx; Most Say Homosexuality Should Be 
Accepted By Society, PEW RESEARCH CENTER (May 13, 2011), available at 
http://pewresearch.org/pubs/1994/poll-support-for-acceptance-of-homosexuality-gay-
parenting-marriage; Ben Brumfield, Voters approve same-sex marriage for the first 
time, CNN (Nov. 7, 2012, 2:24 PM) http://www.cnn.com/2012/11/07/politics/pol-
same-sex-marriage/index.html. 
 5. Port v. Cowan, 44 A.3d 970, 976 (Md. 2012). 
 6. Amin Ghaziani, Post-Gay Collective Identity Construction, 58 SOC. PROBS. 99 
(2011). 
 7. One thousand, one hundred, thirty-eight federal statutory provisions exist where 
marital status is a determinative factor. These rights and responsibilities apply only to 
married heterosexual couples. An Overview of Federal Rights and Protections Granted 
to Married Couples, HUM. RTS. CAMPAIGN (last accessed June 1, 2013), 
http://www.hrc.org/resources/entry/an-overview-of-federal-rights-and-protections-
granted-to-married-couples. 
 8. See, e.g., Goodridge v. Dep’t of Pub. Health, 798 N.E.2d 941, 955-56 (Mass. 
2003); Lisa Bennett & Gary J. Gates, The Cost of Marriage Inequality to Children and 
Their Same-Sex Parents, HUM. RTS. CAMPAIGN (Apr. 13, 2004),  
http://www.hrc.org/files/assets/resources/costkids.pdf. 
 9. Varnum v. Brien, 763 N.W.2d 862, 903 n.28 (Iowa 2009). 
 10. Id. 
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medical procedures will be used when the patient has no living will.11 
In many states, spouses have the power to decide when anatomical 
gifts will be made.12 Same-sex couples in this position, are not entitled 
to these spousal benefits. While in theory, a same-sex couple could 
enter into private agreements regarding property division, end of life 
decisions and, generally, each person’s responsibilities in the event of 
separation. In practice, however, these agreements might resemble 
decisions made in a divorce proceeding, and any court unwilling to 
entertain a same-sex divorce could be equally unwilling to allow 
litigation of “divorce-like” matters.13 
Furthermore, rights flowing from marriage are uniquely valuable 
in the context of family life, and many cannot be reduced to a private 
agreement at all. It seems axiomatic that divorcing parents may not 
enter into custody or visitation agreements concerning their minor 
children without judicial oversight, and the assurance that the 
children’s best interests are truly being served. Even when familial 
rights can be secured through private agreements, the process may be 
expensive, time consuming, and problematic. When same-sex partners 
are allowed to legally marry, for example, each automatically acquires 
parental rights to children born or adopted into the relationship. 
Although a second-parent adoption14 could conceivably achieve the 
same result in a jurisdiction where the same couple is not allowed to 
marry, many states do not permit second-parent adoptions.15 Even 
when they are permitted, a second-parent adoption can be a fairly 
complicated legal proceeding and if either partner has second thoughts 
about it, the whole process can be manipulated and delayed.16 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
 11. Id. 
 12. Id. 
 13. Louis Thorson, Same-Sex Divorce and Wisconsin Courts: Imperfect Harmony?, 
92 MARQ. L. REV. 617, 635 (2009). 
 14. See Christine Metteer Lorillard, Placing Second-Parent Adoption Along the 
‘Rational Continuum’ of Constitutionally Protected Family Rights, 30 RUTGERS 
WOMEN’S RTS L. RPTR 1 (2008) (comprehensively discussing the expense and 
challenges involved). 
 15. Id. 
 16. See, e.g., C.M. v. C.C., 867 N.Y.S.2d 884 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2008) (describing one 
partner’s unsuccessful attempts to adopt children she had helped to parent, and the 
many ways the biological parent hindered, delayed, and ultimately blocked the 
adoption.); see also Miranda Leitsinger, Despite Marriage Progress, Gay Couples 
Face Big Hurdles to Parenthood; NBCNEWS.COM (Aug. 5, 2012), 
http://usnews.nbcnews.com/_news/2012/08/05/13037230-despite-marriage-progress-
gay-couples-face-big-hurdles-to-parenthood?lite. 
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Beyond the obvious and often celebrated affirmative rights to 
marriage, “the single most important benefit of marriage [may well be] 
divorce . . . a predictable process by which property is divided, debt is 
apportioned and custodial arrangements are made for children.”17 For a 
same-sex couple in a mobile society, that “single most important 
benefit,” may easily go unnoticed18 until it is too late—and then it may 
prove to be extremely elusive. The most recent statistics reveal the 
failure rate for same-sex marriages is slightly lower than that of 
opposite-sex marriages.19 Members of younger same-sex couples may 
tend to entertain the belief that their relationships will be different—
and more enduring—than the relationships of their opposite-sex 
counterparts. Thus, the optimistic and unsuspecting American same-
sex couple who marries in Canada and returns to the United States, or 
moves from a state that recognizes same-sex marriage to a state that 
does not, may find the precious bonds of matrimony transformed into 
shackles that cannot be easily shed.20 
The scope of this invisible social issue is enormous and growing. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
 17. Sue Horton, The Next Same-Sex Challenge: Divorce, L.A. TIMES (July 25, 
2008), http://articles.latimes.com/2008/jul/25/local/me-gaydivorce25. 
 18. Todd Brower, It’s Not Just Shopping, Urban Lofts, and the Lesbian Gay-By 
Boom: How Sexual Orientation Demographics Can Inform Family Courts, 17 AM. U.J. 
GENDER SOC. POL’Y & L. 1, 10 (citing a recent New York Times article profiling young 
same-sex couples who overwhelmingly believed that “divorce statistics only apply to 
others”). 
 19. See M.V. Lee Badgett & Jody L. Herman, Patterns of Relationship Recognition 
by Same-Sex Couples in the United States; THE WILLIAMS INST. 1 (2011), available at 
http://williamsinstitute.law.ucla.edu/wp-content/uploads/Badgett-Herman-Marriage-
Dissolution-Nov-2011.pdf. Same-sex marriage has not been legalized long enough to 
establish comprehensive divorce statistics, but the current numbers do not reflect a 
wide disparity with opposite-sex marriage. Id. (“In the states with available data, 
dissolution rates for same-sex couples are slightly lower on average than divorce rates 
of different-sex couples”); cf. A study on same-sex marriages in Norway and Sweden 
found that divorce rates were higher in same-sex marriages than in opposite-sex 
marriages Gunnar Andersson et al., The Demographics of Same-Sex Marriages in 
Norway and Sweden, 43 DEMOGRAPHY 79 (2006), available at 
http://www.demogr.mpg.de/papers/working/wp-2004-018.pdf (finding that divorce 
rates were higher in same-sex marriages than in opposite-sex marriages); but see 
Marian Jones, Lessons from a Gay Marriage: Despite Stereotypes of Gay Relationships 
as Short-Lived, Gay Unions Highlight the Keys to Success, PSYCHOL. TODAY (May 1, 
1997), http://www.psychologytoday.com/articles/199705/lessons-gay-marriage (“In 
Denmark, where homosexuals have been legally able to get [married and divorced] 
since 1989, it’s a modern reality . . . the divorce rate among Danish homosexuals is 
only 17 percent, compared to 46 percent for heterosexuals.”). 
 20. See Chambers v. Ormiston, 935 A.2d 956 (R.I. 2007). 
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In 2010, The United States Census Bureau estimated that 
approximately 594,000 unmarried same-sex couples reside in the 
country and 115,000 of those couples are raising children.21 Since an 
openly gay same-sex couple is a fairly recent phenomenon, younger 
lesbians’ and gay men’s expectations is that divorce is an issue more 
for the heterosexual community than for the gay community.22 This 
article explores the nuances of the same-sex divorce issue and 
examines a selection of the disparate judicial responses. It also 
attempts to identify a pattern that makes sense of those decisions, 
particularly as they affect the interests of children.  
II. FACTORS AFFECTING RECOGNITION OF SAME-SEX 
MARRIAGE 
It is beyond cavil that in order to obtain a divorce, a couple must 
first have entered into a valid marriage. 23  In the United States, 
variations in the legal landscape of individual states may affect a 
state’s response to a couple’s efforts to enter into—and, therefore, 
dissolve—a same-sex marriage. Just over half of all states have 
constitutional amendments limiting marriage to the legal union of one 
man and one woman.24 For many years, these amendments withstood 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
 21. Daphne Lofquist, Same-Sex Couple Households, American Community Survey 
Briefs, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, Sept. 2011, at 2, available at  
http://www.census.gov/prod/2011pubs/acsbr10-03.pdf. 
 22. See, e.g, Erica C. Barnett et al., Four Weddings and a Lawsuit, THE STRANGER 
(Seattle, WA.), Mar. 11, 2004, http://www.thestranger.com/seattle/four-weddings-and-
a-lawsuit/content?oid=17393 (tracking the wedding plans of some young gay men and 
chronicling their belief that they will defy societal odds and live happily ever after). 
 23. See, e.g., Gromeeko v. Gromeeko, 110 Cal. App. 2d 117, 123 (Cal. Dist. Ct. 
App. 1952); Roseberry v. Roseberry, 17 Ga. 139, 140 (Ga. 1855); Franklin v. Franklin, 
365 Mo. 442, 445 (Mo. 1955); Fagan v. Fagan, 11 N.Y.S. 748, 753 (N.Y. Gen. Term 
1890). 
 24. The thirty states that have “constitutionalized” a prohibition against same-sex 
marriage are Alabama, Alaska, Arizona, Arkansas, Colorado, Florida, Georgia, 
Hawai’i, Idaho, Kansas, Kentucky, Louisiana, Michigan, Mississippi, Missouri, 
Montana, Nebraska, Nevada, North Carolina, North Dakota, Ohio, Oklahoma, Oregon, 
South Carolina, South Dakota, Tennessee, Texas, Utah, Virginia, and Wisconsin. 
Defining Marriage: Defense of Marriage Acts and Same-Sex Marriage Laws, NAT’L 
CONF. OF ST. LEGISLATURES (May 3, 2013), http://www.ncsl.org/issues-
research/human-services/same-sex-marriage-overview.aspx. California’s constitutional 
ban on same sex marriage has been ruled unconstitutional in the federal courts, Perry v. 
Brown, 671 F.3d 1052 (9th Cir. 2012), and is currently before the United States 
Supreme Court, United States v. Windsor, No. 12-307 (U.S. argued Mar. 27, 2013). 
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judicial challenge.25 By enshrining a ban on same-sex marriage in the 
state constitution, citizens in these states hoped to provide a nearly 
complete barrier to a same-sex couple seeking a divorce after entering 
into a valid marriage elsewhere.26 In addition to limiting those who 
may marry under state law through state constitutional amendments, 
most states also have legislation that seeks to impose the same 
restrictions on marriage.27 These laws, called Defense of Marriage Acts 
(DOMA), have not proved to be a complete barrier to gay marriage and 
hence they are not a clear indication of whether a validly married 
same-sex couple from another jurisdiction would be granted a divorce 
in a “DOMA state.”28 Additionally, the executive branches of some 
states have promulgated rules and regulations that confer rights on 
homosexuals or on same-sex couples; similarly, some states have 
enacted legislation protecting homosexuals in various contexts 
unrelated to marriage. These administrative regulations and statutes 
may play a factor in the outcome of a same-sex divorce action, even 
though they do not mention same-sex marriage at all, and even if the 
state does not permit same-sex marriage as a matter of affirmative law. 
Finally, an important additional variable in a given state’s law that may 
affect the outcome of a same-sex divorce petition is whether that 
state’s courts have been confronted with legal issues involving the 
children of same-sex parents, or the rights of same-sex parents as 
parents. 
A. State Constitutional Amendments: The (Almost) Airtight 
Lockdown 
Originally, state constitutional amendments banning same-sex 
marriage appeared absolutely airtight. For example, in O’Darling v. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
 25. But cf. Perry v. Brown, 671 F.3d 1052, 1063 (9th Cir. 2012) (finding 
unconstitutional a California state constitutional amendment barring marriages 
between same-sex couples). 
 26. See, e.g., O’Darling v. O’Darling, 188 P.3d 137 (Okla. 2008). In O’Darling, a 
judge entered a divorce decree for a same-sex couple who had entered into a valid 
marriage elsewhere because he did not realize they were a same-sex couple. Upon 
discovering the true situation, he vacated the decree and openly reprimanded the 
lawyer for violating the Oklahoma Rules of Professional Responsibility. 
 27. Defining Marriage: Defense of Marriage Acts and Same-Sex Marriage Laws, 
NAT’L CONF. OF ST. LEGISLATURES (June 2012), http://www.ncsl.org/issues-
research/human-services/same-sex-marriage-overview.aspx. 
 28. See Christiansen v. Christiansen, 253 P.3d 153 (Wyo. 2011); Port v. Cowan, 44 
A.3d 970 (Md. 2012). 
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O’Darling, a same-sex couple “purportedly married in Toronto, 
Canada” sought a divorce in an Oklahoma court.29 The Oklahoma state 
constitution includes an amendment limiting marriage to the union of 
one man and one woman.30 Only one of the two women seeking a 
divorce appeared in court, no one mentioned that the marriage was 
between two women, and the caption on the case did not indicate the 
parties’ genders.31 The trial court granted the petition for dissolution of 
marriage.32 Days later, a reporter contacted the judge to inquire about 
the purported divorce of a same-sex couple; the judge promptly 
rescinded the divorce decree. 33  When the parties appealed to the 
Oklahoma Supreme Court, the court affirmed rescission of the decree. 
It then sanctioned the lawyer for the woman who had appeared in 
court.34 The court averred that the lawyer had perpetrated a fraud on the 
court by failing to mention the couple’s gender. In light of Oklahoma’s 
constitutional ban on same-sex marriage, the lawyer had “knowingly . . 
. fail[ed] to disclose legal authority in the controlling jurisdiction 
known to the lawyer to be directly adverse to the position of the 
client.”35 
Indeed, constitutional amendments are still steamrolling across 
the country. A recently proposed amendment to Minnesota’s 
Constitution read: “Only a union of one man and one woman shall be 
valid or recognized in Minnesota.”36 Michigan voters amended their 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
 29. O’Darling, 188 P.3d 137, at 138. 
 30. OKLA. CONST. art. II, §35. 
 31. O’Darling, 188 P.3d at 138. 
 32. Id. 
 33. Id. 
 34. Id. at 140 (finding that the women were entitled to personal notice and should 
be given a hearing on the dismissal). 
 35. OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 5, §1 (West); cf. Christiansen v. Christiansen, 253 P.3d 
153 (Wyo. 2011) (The court found that persons subject to a valid foreign same-sex 
marriage may be party to divorce proceedings without violating Wyoming statutes 
against same-sex marriage. Unlike Oklahoma, Wyoming does not have a constitutional 
amendment forbidding same-sex marriages.). 
 36. S.F. No. 1308, MINN. SENATE, available at  
https://www.revisor.mn.gov/bin/bldbill.php?bill=S1308.1.html&session=ls87;  
cf. MINN. STAT. ANN. § 517.03 (West 2009) (currently prohibiting marriage between 
persons of the same-sex). This proposed amendment was denied by the Minnesota 
citizenry during the 2012 Presidential Election. See Voters in Minnesota Reject 
Discriminatory Amendment Denying Marriage for Same-Sex Couples, ACLU (Nov. 7, 
2012), http://www.aclu.org/lgbt-rights/voters-minnesota-reject-discriminatory 
-amendment-denying-marriage-same-sex-couples. 
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constitution in 2004 with what might be judged as a mean-spirited 
condemnation of same-sex marriage: 
To secure and preserve the benefits of marriage for our society 
and for future generations of children, the union of one man and 
one woman in marriage shall be the only agreement recognized as 
a marriage or similar union for any purpose.37 
In North Carolina, voters supplemented the state’s statutory 
prohibition on same-sex marriage with a constitutional amendment, 
effective May 9, 2012. The amendment became so publicized and 
vehemently debated that President Barack Obama was driven to weigh 
in on same-sex marriage.38 Furthermore, North Carolina’s attempt to 
limit marriage to the union of one man and one woman may give rise 
to unintended—and negative—consequences for a diverse cross-
section of the state’s citizens. The amendment is particularly broad 
stating: “Marriage between a man and a woman is the only domestic 
legal union that shall be valid or recognized in this state.”39 The 
untested term “domestic legal union” may invalidate rights of the 
86,366 cohabitating unmarried couples in North Carolina, ninety-one 
percent of whom are heterosexual.40 Thus, it may prevent enforcement 
of custody and visitation orders, and potentially eliminate the health 
benefits some municipalities currently offer to same-sex partners and 
their children. 
In 2008, the California Supreme Court concluded that the state’s 
DOMA, passed in 1996, unconstitutionally limited marriage to 
opposite-sex couples. The law resembled the federal DOMA, 41 
granddaddy of them all, and both were created as a panicked reaction 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
 37. MICH. CONST. art. I, § 25 (West, Westlaw through Nov. 2010 amendments). 
 38. Josh Earnest, President Obama Supports Same-Sex Marriage, THE WHITE 
HOUSE BLOG (May 10, 2012, 7:31 PM),  
http://www.whitehouse.gov/blog/2012/05/10/obama-supports-same-sex-marriage; 
Jackie Calmes & Peter Baker, Obama Says Same-Sex Marriage Should Be Legal, N.Y. 
TIMES (May 9, 2012), http://www.nytimes.com/2012/05/10/us/politics/obama-says-
same-sex-marriage-should-be-legal.html?pagewanted=all. 
 39. N.C. CONST. art. XIV, § 6. 
 40. Maxine Eichner et al., Potential Legal Impact of the Proposed Same-Sex 
Marriage Amendment to the North Carolina Constitution (June 6, 2011) (unpublished 
manuscript) (on file with the ACLU of North Carolina), available at 
http://www.acluofnc.org/files/Final%20Marriage%20Amendment%20Report%202. 
pdf. 
 41. The federal DOMA was signed into law by President Clinton in 1997. Defense 
of Marriage Act, Pub. L. No. 104-199 (Sept. 21, 1996). 
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to the possibility of Hawaii recognizing same-sex marriage.42 Both 
DOMAs had two effects. First, they provided for purposes of state law, 
the word “marriage” encompasses only legal unions between one man 
and one woman. Additionally, a ‘spouse’ is only a person of the 
opposite sex who is either a husband or a wife.43 A second substantive 
effect, relieved states from recognizing same-sex marriages solemnized 
in a different jurisdiction. 
In the wake of this decision,44 opponents of same-sex marriage 
rallied to get Proposition 8 on the ballot in California’s next statewide 
election. Proposition 8 provided that it would: “ELIMINATE[] RIGHT 
OF SAME-SEX COUPLES TO MARRY. INITIATIVE 
CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENT.”45 It passed by a fifty-two to 
forty-eight percent margin,46 thus adding the sentence: “Only marriage 
between a man and a woman is valid or recognized in California.”47 
Opponents of the newly enacted constitutional amendment argued that 
it was invalid—such a radical change to the California constitution 
could not be accomplished through the amendment process and 
required, instead a considerably more restrictive legislative process.48 
The California Supreme Court confronted the newly amended 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
 42. Massachusetts v. U.S. Dep’t of Health and Human Servs., Nos. 10–2204, 10–
2207, 10–2214. 
2012 WL 1948017 (1st Cir. May 31, 2012). 
 43. See 1 U.S.C. §7. 
 44. In re Marriage Cases, 183 P.3d 384 (Cal. 2008). 
 45. General Election Official Voter Information Guide: Prop 8 Official Title and 
Summary, ATT’Y GEN. OF CAL. (Nov. 4, 2008),  
http://voterguide.sos.ca.gov/past/2008/general/title-sum/prop8-title-sum.htm. 
 46. CAL. SEC’Y OF STATE, STATEMENT OF VOTE: NOVEMBER 4, 2008, GENERAL 
ELECTION, at 7 (Nov. 4, 2008), 
www.sos.ca.gov/elections/sov/2008-general/sov_complete.pdf. 
 47. CAL. CONST. art. 1 §7.5. 
 48. Bruce E. Cain, Constitutional Revision in California: The Triumph of 
Amendment Over Revision, available at camlaw.rutgers.edu/statecon/cain.pdf. The 
challenge asked whether the initiative represented an amendment or a revision of the 
state Constitution. It was presented to voters as an amendment, which can change the 
Constitution through the initiative process with a simple-majority vote of the people. A 
revision, however, would need to be placed on the ballot with a two-thirds vote of the 
Legislature. The only other potential avenue for a revision would be for it to arise 
during a state constitutional convention. The distinction, in simple terms, is between 
the tinkering of the constitution (amendment) and an overhaul of its fundamental 
underpinnings (revision). Rights in the Balance, S.F. CHRONICLE: SFGATE (Mar. 5, 
2009, 4:00 AM), 
http://www.sfgate.com/opinion/article/Rights-in-the-balance-3169292.php. 
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state constitution in an opinion that, at least on the surface, appeared to 
wholeheartedly defend traditional marriage.49 By affirming the validity 
of the amendment, the decision demonstrated the effectiveness of 
constitutional amendments as tools for preventing same-sex marriage.50 
The court stressed, however, the limitations inherent in its opinion. In 
California, the word “marriage” could now refer only to the union of 
one man and one woman.51  The other conclusions the court had 
reached in rejecting the state DOMA, however remained perfectly 
valid. 52  Thus, although their relationships could not be called 
“marriage,” committed same-sex couples would continue to fall within 
“the constitutionally protected right of intimate association” 53  and 
sexual orientation would still be considered a suspect classification; 
any governmental intrusions would still have to withstand the strictest 
scrutiny.54 The power of a constitutional amendment to ban same-sex 
marriage appeared weakened already. 
Thus, the California Supreme Court delivered the opponents of 
gay marriage an incomplete victory, and it was a temporary victory at 
that. Less than a year after the California Supreme Court’s ruling, two 
same-sex couples filed suit in the Federal District Court for the 
Northern District of California, alleging a violation of their due process 
and equal protection rights guaranteed by the federal constitution. In a 
meticulous decision, replete with findings of fact, the court ruled that 
Proposition 8 was unconstitutional under the Fourteenth Amendment to 
the United States Constitution on both due process and equal protection 
grounds. First, Proposition 8 denied same-sex couples the fundamental 
right to marry. Second, Proposition 8 impermissibly created a 
distinction between opposite-sex couples and same-sex couples with no 
legally cognizable justification. Although the appropriate public 
officials refused to appeal, and the California Attorney General simply 
agreed with the District Court’s ruling, the original proponents of 
Proposition 8 were granted standing to appeal.55 The case thus made its 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
 49. See ProtectMarriage.com. Traditional Marriage Upheld in California, AM. 
CENTER FOR L. & JUST. (May 29, 2009), 
http://media.aclj.org/pdf/traditionalmarriageupheld_ca_052909.pdf. 
 50. Strauss v. Horton, 207 P.3d 48 (Cal. 2009). 
 51. Maura Dolan, California High Court Upholds Prop. 8, L.A. TIMES (May 27, 
2009), http://articles.latimes.com/2009/may/27/local/me-gay-marriage27. 
 52. Id. 
 53. In re Marriage Cases, 183 P.3d 384, 423 (Cal. 2008). 
 54. Id. at 401. 
 55. Perry v. Brown, 671 F.3d 1052, 1096 (9th Cir. 2012). 
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way to the Ninth Circuit, less than a year after the federal district 
court’s decision. The efficacy of constitutional amendments as a means 
of banning gay marriage and gay divorce now seemed to be hanging by 
a mere thread. 
A divided panel of the Ninth Circuit severed that thread in a 
surgical strike. The court deftly sidestepped the federal district court’s 
detailed articulation of the fundamental right to marry the partner of 
one’s choice, and the equal protection violation inherent in Proposition 
8. The panel held that Proposition 8 singled out same-sex couples for 
unequal treatment “by taking away from them alone the right to 
marry.” 56  The court concluded that the Equal Protection Clause 
protects minority groups from government action that takes away an 
existing right.57 In other words, in a state that had never recognized 
same-sex marriage, a constitutional amendment might constitute a 
formidable barrier. However, if same-sex marriage had been 
recognized, all bets are off. And it remains to be seen what level of 
“recognition” will suffice.58 
B. “Defense of Marriage” Legislation: The Fabulous Facade 
Despite their enormous popularity,59 states’ defense of marriage 
laws have consistently proved vulnerable to legal challenges based on 
the right to privacy enshrined in each state constitution. California state 
law provides a particularly dramatic example of this phenomenon. In 
2000, California voters overwhelming approved a defense of marriage 
law60 placed on the ballot as Proposition 22.61 Proposition 22 amended 
the state statutory scheme governing marriage to define marriage as “a 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
 56. Id. at 1077. 
 57. Id. at 1096. 
 58. Proponents of Proposition 8, currently seeking certiorari from the Supreme 
Court, conversely assert the Ninth Circuit’s ruling was broader than represented, since 
it generally found no rational purpose to a law limiting marriage to opposite-sex 
couples. See Bob Egelko, Prop. 8 Backers Seek Top Court’s Support, S.F. CHRONICLE: 
SFGATE (July 31, 2012, 10:43 PM), http://www.sfgate.com/nation/article/Prop-8-
backers-seek-top-court-s-support-3751623.php; see also Petition for Writ of Certiorari, 
Hollingsworth v. Perry at 6, 25-6 (July 31, 2012), available at  
http://www.adfmedia.org/files/BrownCertPetition.pdf. 
 59. See Defining Marriage: Defense of Marriage Acts and Same-Sex Marriage 
Laws, supra note 29. 
 60. That year, 4,618,673 votes were cast for Proposition 22 versus 2,909,370 
against. www.census.gov/census2000/states/ca.html. 
 61. Prop 22 Official Title and Summary, ATT’Y GEN. OF CAL. (Mar. 7, 2000), 
http://primary2000.sos.ca.gov/VoterGuide/Propositions/22.htm. 
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personal relation arising out of a civil contract between a man and a 
woman to which the consent of the parties capable of making that 
contract is necessary.”62 Eight years later, the California Supreme 
Court held that the California marriage statute, as amended by 
Proposition 22, violated both the substantive and equal protection 
provisions of the state constitution.63 Sexual orientation, it held, was a 
protected classification, and a law that used sexual orientation, as a 
means of classification or denied rights based on sexual orientation 
could not withstand constitutional scrutiny. 64  Same-sex marriage 
became the law of the land, DOMA or no DOMA—at least until voters 
inserted identical language into the state constitution less than a year 
later.65 
Similarly, in Iowa, a district court judge ruled that the state’s 
DOMA was unconstitutional.66 Although the judge suspended his own 
decision less than twenty-four hours after issuing it, two enterprising 
college students acted quickly, obtained a marriage license, and, at 
least for a short time, had the distinction of being Iowa’s first—and 
only—same-sex couple with a valid Iowan marriage license. 67  A 
unanimous Iowa Supreme Court laid the matter to rest four months 
later in a decision holding that the state statute limiting marriage to one 
man and one woman violated the state constitution.68 Devotees of the 
state DOMA might well heed the Court’s explanation of the 
responsibilities of the three branches of government. While the 
legislature might enact a statute consistent with popular opinion, the 
executive branch would then enforce it, but that the courts must 
“protect the supremacy of the constitution”69 and, when necessary, 
“withdraw certain subjects from the vicissitudes of political 
controversy.”70 This court applied an intermediate level of scrutiny to 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
 62. CAL. FAM. CODE § 300 (Deering 2012). 
 63. In re Marriage Cases, 183 P.3d 384 (Cal. 2008). 
 64. Id. at 423. 
 65. CAL. CONST. art. I, § 7.5. 
 66. Lynda Waddington, Iowa Becomes A Battleground In The Same-Sex Marriage 
Wars, THE IOWA INDEP. (Dec. 4, 2008, 1:48 PM), 
http://iowaindependent.com/9241/iowa-becomes-a-battleground-in-the-same-sex-
marriage-wars. 
 67. Id. 
 68. Varnum v. Brien, 763 N.W.2d 862 (Iowa 2009).  
 69. Id. at 875. 
 70. Id. Those who read the opinion and cheered for Iowa were somewhat taken 
aback when Iowans voted out the three justices who were up for reelection “post 
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conclude that the state marriage statute violated equal protection.71 
Later, the whole concept of a DOMA received a body blow in a 
new venue—the First Circuit Court of Appeals.72 The First Circuit 
initially determined that it needed no new category of suspect 
classification to test the constitutionality of the federal DOMA.73 
Instead, it reviewed the specific nature of the federal DOMA and the 
discrepancies it created, the burdens it imposed, and finally, “the 
infirmities of the justifications offered.”74 Although the court noted that 
the federal government must determine who is married to whom in 
various specific circumstances,75 setting the general parameters of a 
valid marriage is a task entrusted to the states under principles of 
federalism. 76  Since the federal DOMA imposed a sweeping and 
unprecedented restriction on a matter traditionally within state control, 
it required special scrutiny.77 
Three government interests were advanced in support of the 
challenged section of the federal DOMA.78 First, it was necessary to 
“defend[] and nurtur[e][] the institution of traditional heterosexual 
marriage. Second, it would “defend[] traditional notions of morality.”79 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
opinion.” A. G. Sulzberger, Ouster of Iowa Judges Sends Signal to Bench, N.Y. TIMES 
(Nov. 3, 2010), http://www.nytimes.com/2010/11/04/us/politics/04judges.html?_r=0. 
 71. Id. at 896. It was unnecessary, the court observed, to consider whether stricter 
scrutiny was appropriate, since the statute could not be justified at even an intermediate 
level. Id. 
 72. In the underlying case, the District Court found that Gill v. Office of Pers. 
Mgmt., violated the Equal Protection clause. Gill v. Office of Pers. Mgmt., 699 F. 
Supp. 2d 374, 397 (D. Mass. 2010). In a companion case, the District Court concluded 
that section 3 of 1 U.S.C. §7 violated the Tenth Amendment and the Spending Clause. 
Massachusetts v. U.S. Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., 698 F. Supp. 2d 234 (D. 
Mass. 2010), aff’d, 682 F.3d 1 (1st Cir. 2012). 
 73. Massachusetts v. U.S. Dep’t of Health and Human Servs., 682 F.3d at 8. 
 74. Id. at 10. 
 75. Id. at 12. Medical benefits for federal workers, for example, would require the 
federal government to have some means of defining marriage. 
 76. Hisquierdo v. Hisquierdo, 439 U.S. 572, 581 (1979) (quoting In re Burris, 136 
U.S. 586, 593-94 (1890) (“The whole subject of the domestic relations of husband and 
wife, parent and child belongs to the laws of the states and not to the laws of the United 
States.”). 
 77. Massachusetts v. U.S. Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., 682 F.3d at 13; But see 
Windsor v. United States, 699 F.3d 169 (2012). 
 78. A fourth justification was included in the record but was inapplicable to the 
court’s analysis. 682 F.3d at 14 (referencing “protecting state sovereignty and 
democratic self-governance” as a fourth reason that was included in the House 
Committee Report). 
 79. Id. 
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Third, it would “preserv[e][] scarce government resources.”80 Turning 
to what it denominated as the most “concrete” of the rationales, the 
court noted that it might or might not be true, but in any event the First 
Circuit created an equal protection problem by singling out a 
disfavored minority.81 The court made swift work of the final two 
rationales, noting, with a touch of impatience, that DOMA did not 
increase any benefit to opposite-sex couples and that moral disapproval 
was insufficient justification to uphold the law.82 The DOMA as a 
barrier to same-sex marriage, and therefore same-sex divorce, had 
grounded on rocky shoals indeed. 
C. Legislation, Rules, and Regulations: The Roundabout 
Route to Recognition of Same-Sex Relationships 
DOMA legislation may have proved to be an ineffective weapon 
in the culture wars,83 but other legislation, unrelated to marriage or 
divorce, has occasionally been a key ingredient in decisions 
recognizing same-sex marriage or same-sex divorce. For example, 
although Iowa’s DOMA had been in force for over a decade,84 prior to 
the law’s inception, Iowa’s General Assembly had taken steps to 
protect homosexual Iowans. The Assembly had defined hate crimes to 
include offenses committed because of the victim’s sexual 
orientation,85 and had taken steps to define and prohibit schoolyard 
bullying that was based on a perception of sexual orientation.86 Iowa 
laws relating to housing, 87  employment, 88  and public accommoda-
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
 80. H.R. REP. NO. 104-664 at 12 (1996), reprinted in 1996 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2905, 
2916. 
 81. Massachusetts v. U.S. Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., 682 F.3d at 14. 
 82. The brevity of the dismissal of these last two rationales will resonate with 
anyone who has been in the trenches – judicial or otherwise – for the last few decades. 
They seem be very tired old saws indeed. 
 83. The phrase “culture war” may be related to the German term “Kulturkamp” 
(“culture struggle” or “struggle between cultures;” literally “battle of cultures.”). See 
Perry v. Brown, 671 F.3d 1052, 1095 (9th Cir. 2012) (finding Prop. 8 did not result 
from a legitimate “Kulturkampf” as it operates with no purpose but to impose the 
majority’s private disapproval upon the homosexual community). 
 84. The Iowa legislature amended the marriage laws in 1998 to provide “[o]nly a 
marriage between a male and female is valid.” Varnum v. Brien, 763 N.W.2d at 873. 
 85. Id. at 889-90. 
 86. Id. 
 87. Id. at 891, citing IOWA CODE 216.8. 
 88. Id. citing IOWA CODE 216.6. 
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tions, 89  among many others, had also been enacted to protect 
homosexual Iowans. In its 2009 decision invalidating the state DOMA 
and affirmatively recognizing a right to same-sex marriage, the Iowa 
court used these types of legislation in two ways. First, it noted that the 
legislation was evidence that Iowans realized it was necessary to 
“remedy historical sexual-orientation-based discrimination” 90  and 
protect homosexual Iowans from baseless prejudice. Second, the court 
found that, taken as a whole, Iowa’s legislative scheme demonstrated 
that sexual orientation is not considered an impediment to participating 
fully in society.91 
In Port v. Cowan,92 the Maryland Supreme Court parsed even 
more closely the diverse threads of its state’s statutes in concluding 
that although the same-sex couple could not have married in Maryland, 
the couple could be granted a divorce. The starting point for the court 
was to acknowledge Maryland’s own DOMA93 defining marriage as 
between a man and a woman, and the fact that it had withstood a 
constitutional challenge.94 This was not, however, the linchpin of the 
court’s conclusion. The court noted that the Maryland legislature had 
passed a long list of enactments protecting gay people and same-sex 
couples from discrimination because of sexual orientation in 
employment,95 health care,96 estate planning,97 and other areas. This 
extensive catalogue of enactments convinced the court that recognizing 
a same-sex marriage for a limited purpose was actually consistent with 
Maryland public policy. 98  Thus, the court ruled that the couple’s 
application for divorce did not even implicate Maryland’s DOMA. 
Instead, it held that, under a theory of comity,99 a valid, same-sex 
marriage had to be recognized for the limited purpose of divorce. 
Similarly, New York state amassed a considerable body of 
executive branch pronouncements and statutory law protecting its 
homosexual citizens in a variety of contexts. In 2009, although same-
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
 89. Id. citing IOWA CODE 216.7. 
 90. Id. at 890. 
 91. Id. 
 92. A.3d 970 (Md. 2012). 
 93. MD. CODE ANN., Fam. Law § 2-201. 
 94. Conaway v. Deane, 932 A.2d 571, 635 (Md. 2007). 
 95. Md. Code Ann. State Gov’t §2-606. 
 96. See, e.g., Md. Code Ann., Health-Gen §6-101. 
 97. See, e.g., Md. Code Ann., Tax-Prop §§12-101(e-2). 
 98. Port v. Cowan, A.3d at 980. 
 99. Id. at 982. 
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sex marriages could not yet be solemnized under New York law,100 
New York courts had granted same-sex divorces, and had explicitly 
recognized the validity of the underlying marriage, in part because to 
do so was consistent with this body of protective memoranda, opinion 
letters, and administrative rulings. Furthermore, the Office of the State 
Attorney General issued an opinion acknowledging that although a 
same-sex marriage could not be solemnized under New York law, 
parties to valid same-sex marriages must be treated as spouses for 
purposes of state law.101 New York City reached the same conclusion 
with respect to certain benefits pursuant to its pension system.102 
Additionally, in 2007, New York’s Civil Service Department issued a 
memorandum stating it would recognize valid out-of-state same-sex 
marriages for a variety of department-administered benefit programs, 
such as the state health insurance program. 
The persuasive value of legislation protecting same-sex couples, 
as evidence of favorable public policy, is uniquely shown by 
comparing a 1991 New York case concerning a same-sex partner’s 
visitation rights, and a 2007 New York same-sex divorce case also 
concerning visitation rights. In 1991, when adjudicating the Matter of 
Allison D. v. Virginia M.,103 the court refused to award visitation rights 
to a non-biological same-sex partner, despite the couple’s planning for 
the conception and birth of the child, as well as their agreement to 
share all rights and responsibilities of child-rearing.104 A blistering, 
often cited dissent noted that the purpose of the visitation law was to 
promote “the welfare and happiness of the child,” not to create 
restrictions not found in the statute itself.105 
In 2007, with a backdrop of same-sex couples receiving 
newfound legal recognition, another same-sex couple took their marital 
dispute to New York Family Court.106 One member of the couple, Beth 
R., sought a divorce, including a custody determination for the minor 
children born to her partner. The partner, Donna M., argued that the 
couple’s marriage, entered into in Canada, was not valid in New York, 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
 100. Beth R. v. Donna M., 853 N.Y.S.2d 501, 505 (Sup. Ct. 2008). 
 101. Id. at 505 (Sup. Ct. 2008) (citing 2004 N.Y. Op. (Inf.) Att’y Gen. 1, at 34-5). 
 102. Id. at 506 (citing Letter of Corporation Counsel [*5] Michael A. Cardozo to 
Hon. Michael R. Bloomberg, dated Nov. 17, 2004.). 
 103. 572 N.E.2d 27 (N.Y. 1991). 
 104. Id. at 655. 
 105. Beth R., 853 N.Y.S.2d at 506-07 (quoting Alison D., 77 N.Y.2d 651, 659 (N.Y. 
1991) (Kaye, C.J., dissenting)). 
 106. Id. at 503-04. 
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since they could not have entered into a valid marriage under New 
York law. With no marriage there could be no divorce, and Beth would 
be a legal stranger to the minor children. The New York Family Court 
concluded that the marriage was valid.107 The bulk of the opinion 
addressed the formation of the familial relationship and the parties’ 
relationships to the children. The court bolstered its decision that the 
marriage must be considered valid, however, by noting that the 
protections lavished on same-sex couples by state law militate against a 
ruling that the marriage is void,108 and inveighs against the constriction 
resulting from Alison D.109 
So, finally, after crafting eloquent constructs to protect the 
children of gay couples, espousing gay-friendly policies, and creating 
remedies against discrimination, the inevitable happened. New York 
reached a tipping point. The New York Legislature passed a bill 
granting same-sex couples the right to marry, effective July 24, 
2011.110 
D. And (In Some States) Little Children Shall Lead Them 
In New York, the impetus to protect children played a significant 
role; indeed, this aspect of same-sex relationships may be the most 
powerful factor causing any state to recognize same-sex marriage and 
same-sex divorce. In its landmark decision recognizing same-sex 
marriage, for example, the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts 
emphasized the role marriage has in protecting and nurturing 
children.111 The Goodridge complaint paints detailed pictures of home 
life within same-sex families: children who play violin, take karate 
lessons, and excel in sports. 112  The majority also cited precedent 
establishing that the best interests of a child have no relationship to the 
sexual orientation of the parent.113 The majority noted, further, that the 
state affirmatively facilitates bringing children into a family unit 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
 107. Id. at 505. Other aspects of this opinion are discussed in Section D, infra p. 79. 
 108. Id. at 505-06. 
 109. Id. at 507. 
 110. N.Y. DOM. REL. LAW § 13 (McKinney 2012) (“No application for a marriage 
license shall be denied on the ground that the parties are of the same, or a different, 
sex.”). 
 111. Goodridge v. Dep’t of Pub. Health, 798 N.E.2d 941 (Mass. 2003). 
 112. Verified Complaint at 6:65, Goodridge v. Dep’t of Pub. Health, 798 N.E.2d 941 
(Mass. 2003) (No. 01-1647 A). 
 113. Goodridge, 798 N.E.2d at 963 (noting that the state readily conceded that same-
sex parents may be “excellent parents.”). 
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regardless of whether the intended parents are heterosexual, 
homosexual or bisexual but that the task of parenting is made infinitely 
more difficult by preventing some parents from marrying.114 In its 
concurring opinion, the court takes a conciliatory tone when describing 
same-sex couples as an active and productive part of their 
communities. In short, the decision to allow valid, same-sex marriages, 
and so to allow same-sex divorce, was intimately connected to the 
interests of children. 
Although the Rhode Island Supreme Court was not required to 
discuss same-sex marriage in its decision Rubano v. DiCenzo,115 it 
similarly used the case to demonstrate the same overarching concern 
for children regardless of the parents’ gender. Rubano involved a 
lesbian couple who had arranged for a child to be born through 
artificial insemination. 116  The couple lived together “as domestic 
partners in the same household”117 until the child, a boy, was four. At 
that point, differences arose between the women and they separated.118 
The boy continued to live with Ms. DiCenzo, his biological mother, 
and had informal visitation with Ms. Rubano, his “heart mom.”119 After 
this informal arrangement broke down, Ms. Rubano filed a 
miscellaneous petition in Rhode Island Family Court to establish de 
facto parental status and visitation.120 The parties settled the matter 
prior to trial through a “private agreement,” which the Chief Justice of 
the Family Court reviewed, approved, and entered as an order of the 
court.121 The agreement included provisions for visitation to promote 
“the best interests of the minor child,”122 as an agreement might have in 
attempting to resolve a dispute between opposite-sex parents. It was 
only after this agreement broke down that anyone thought to contest 
the Family Court’s jurisdiction by questioning whether both women 
could qualify as one child’s parents.123 At that point, three questions 
were certified to the Rhode Island Supreme Court, all asking, in 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
 114. Id. 
 115. 759 A.2d 959 (R.I. 2000). 
 116. Id. at 961. 
 117. Id. 
 118. Id. 
 119. Id. at 971. 
 120. Id. at 962. 
 121. Id.; see also id. at n.2 (explaining the legal significance of a consent order or 
private agreement under Rhode Island law). 
 122. Id. at 962. 
 123. Id. at 963. 
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essence, the same question: did Ms. Rubano qualify as a parent?124 
The Rhode Island Supreme Court’s resolution appears to validate 
a same-sex configuration of family life.125 The court held that Ms. 
Rubano had a statutory right126 to ask the Family Court to determine 
“the existence or nonexistence” of a mother and child relationship 
between herself and the child.127 The court noted that any “interested 
party” could bring an action seeking such a determination under the 
Uniform Law on Paternity.128 The terms of this law specified that 
provisions applicable to the father and child relationship would apply 
to the mother and child relationship “insofar as practicable.”129 Further, 
the court noted, Rhode Island case law had established that a putative 
parent could seek redress under this provision without alleging a 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
 124. The questions were: 
Question I: Does a child, biological mother, and same sex partner, who have 
been involved in a committed relationship constitute a ‘family relationship’ 
within the meaning of G.L. 8-10-3, such that the Family Court has 
jurisdiction to entertain a miscellaneous petition for visitation by the former 
same sex partner when the same sex partner is no longer engaged in the 
committed relationship? Id. at 963; 
Question II: “If the answer to the above question is in the negative, does such a 
conclusion violate Article I, Section 5 of the Rhode Island Constitution?” Id. at 965; 
Question III: “If the answer to question I is in the affirmative, then does a non-
biological partner, who has been a same sex partner with a biological mother have 
standing to petition the Rhode Island Family Court for visitation pursuant to G.L. 15-5-
1 et al. [sic]?” Id. at 976-77. 
 125. The court found it unnecessary to rule directly on the first question, which 
asked whether a child, mother and same-sex partner constituted a “family relationship” 
for purposes of family court jurisdiction. Id. at 965. The court noted that the key term 
for purposes of determining jurisdiction was not simply “family relationship,” but 
rather was “‘equitable matters arising out of the family relationship, wherein 
jurisdiction is acquired by the court by the filing of [a] petition[] for divorce”’ or 
related action.” Id. at 964. Since Rubano and DiCenzo had obviously filed no such 
petition, the first needed no answer. The second certified question was linked to the 
first. If the court concluded that the family court did not have jurisdiction by virtue of a 
family relationship, did this conclusion violate the state constitutional guarantee that 
every person “hav[e] recourse to the laws . . . for all injuries or wrongs . . .?” Id. at 966. 
The court concluded that the constitutional guarantee was satisfied because Ms. 
Rubano actually had several possible remedies for the “injury or wrong” of being 
denied visitation. Id. 
 126. See R.I. GEN. LAWS ANN. §15-8-26 (West 2012). 
 127. Rubano, 759 A.2d at 966. 
 128. Id. (Rhode Island adopted a hybrid version of the Uniform Law on Paternity 
(citing P.L. 1979, ch. 185 § 2)). 
 129. Id. (quoting R.I. GEN. LAWS § 15-8-26). 
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biological relationship with the child in question. 130  Thus, Ms. 
Rubano’s “close involvement with the child’s conception,” 131  her 
participation in his upbringing, and the parties’ alleged visitation 
agreement, taken together, constituted a parent-like relationship.132 This 
parent-like relationship gave Ms. Rubano standing to bring a parental 
rights claim.133 
The court identified another remedy available to Ms. Rubano 
arising out of the Rhode Island Uniform Law on Paternity.134 This 
remedy further emphasized its willingness to recognize and support 
same-sex family relationships. Although Ms. Rubano was not a 
biological father, she was “involved” in the joint decision with 
DiCenzo to have DiCenzo conceive a child through artificial 
insemination.135 She also assumed primary financial responsibility for 
the procedure and was included on the child’s birth announcement and 
baptismal certificate.136 The court explained that Ms. Rubano had a 
right to seek a visitation order in the Family Court pursuant to its 
jurisdiction over “those matters relating to adults who shall be involved 
with paternity of children born out of wedlock.”137 The court conceded 
that the term “paternity” ordinarily suggests “fatherhood,” but noted 
that the legislature has specifically rejected such a rigid limitation.138 
Rhode Island General Laws § 43-3-3 provides that “[e]very word 
importing the masculine gender only may be construed to extend to 
and to include females as well as males.”139 Thus, if Ms. Rubano’s 
basic factual allegations proved true, she would have been able to 
establish that she had been “‘involved with [the] paternity of this child 
born out of wedlock”140 and thus could qualify as a de facto parent, 
entitled to visitation.141 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
 130. Id. at 967 (citing Pettinato v. Pettinato, 582 A.2d 909 (R.I. 1990). 
 131. Id. 
 132. Id. 
 133. Id. 
 134. Id. at 970. 
 135. Id. at 971. 
 136. Id. 
 137. Id. (citing R.I. GEN. LAWS § 8-10-3(a) (West 1996)). 
 138. Id. at 970 n.13. 
 139. Id. (citing R.I. GEN. LAWS §43-3-3 (1956)). 
 140. Id. at 971 (noting that the Family Court thus had jurisdiction pursuant to the 
jurisdictional provision of § 8-10-3). 
 141. Id. at 972 (noting that Rubano was also entitled to seek a remedy in the superior 
court pursuant to its general equitable powers, but that the superior court would have 
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The Rubano court further supported this position by noting that 
the idea that parental rights could exist in the absence of either 
adoption or the traditional biological relationship found support in 
other authorities.142 In Troxel v. Granville,143 the United States Supreme 
Court affirmed the principle that a child’s parent has a fundamental 
right to make decisions regarding visitation. The Rubano court noted, 
however, that Troxel recognized that “persons outside the nuclear 
family” may become involved in childrearing.144 Further, the Rubano 
court noted that the High Court’s own precedent has described familial 
rights as relational—arising out of the intimacies of daily association as 
well as from a blood relationship.145 Indeed, the High Court has noted 
the “clear distinction between a mere biological relationship and an 
actual relationship of parental responsibility.”146 Moreover, the United 
States Supreme Court considered the relational rights formed through 
life shared in a common home so crucial that they may sometimes 
trump the rights of a biological parent whose only relationship with the 
child is formed outside the family unit.147 
The Rubano court also voiced its agreement with states that have 
looked beyond biological ties to find that some caregiving adults may 
become psychological parents. In V.C. v. M.J.B.,148 the New Jersey 
Supreme Court found that the same-sex partner of a child’s biological 
mother had become a psychological parent with legally cognizable 
rights, when four criteria were met.149 First, the legal parent must 
consent to the relationship between the third party and the child. 
Second, the third party must have lived with the child.150 Third, the 
third party must have performed parental functions for the child “to a 
significant degree.”151 Fourth, “a parent-child bond must be formed.”152 
The Rubano court noted that these criteria underlie its own analysis.153 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
abstained, as a matter of comity, since suit was initiated in the Family Court). 
 142. See id. at 973-74. 
 143. 530 U.S. 57 (2000). 
 144. Rubano, 759 A.2d at 973 (quoting Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57, 64 (2000)). 
 145. Id. 
 146. Id. (quoting Lehr v. Robertson, 463 U.S. 248, 261 (1983)). 
 147. Id. at 974 (citing Michael H. v. Gerald D., 491 U.S. 110, 123 (1989)). 
 148. 748 A.2d 539 (N.J. 2000). 
 149. Id. at 551. 
 150. Id. 
 151. Id. 
 152. Id. 
 153. Rubano v. DiCenzo, 759 A.2d 959, 974 (R.I. 2000). It also commented on the 
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In its majority opinion, the Court applied provisions of Rhode 
Island’s Uniform Law on Paternity,154 circumventing the fact that both 
parents were female by noting that the woman with no biological ties 
to the child qualified as an “interested party” under the statute.155 Since 
it did not have to contend with the political hot button issue of gay 
marriage, the court felt free to focus on the child’s needs, and his 
relationship with the adults who had raised him—even if it meant 
equating one woman to a father. 156  By validating familial rights 
regardless of parental gender, cases like these often lay the groundwork 
for allowing a same-sex couple to marry—or to divorce. 
Seven years after Rubano, in Chambers v. Ormiston,157 the Rhode 
Island Supreme Court concluded that a childless lesbian couple could 
not use the Rhode Island Family Court to obtain a divorce; a reader 
reflecting on the thoughtful policy arguments of the Rubano majority 
might be puzzled by this conclusion. On the surface, Rhode Island 
seemed a promising venue for seeking a same-sex divorce, even 
though it did not recognize same-sex marriage itself. Rhode Island has 
no constitutional amendment banning gay marriage and no DOMA. 
Located as it is next to Massachusetts,158 it could hardly be a surprise to 
anyone that same-sex Rhode Island couples were regularly crossing 
state lines to enter into valid same-sex marriages. A Massachusetts 
court even opined that Rhode Island couples could be validly married 
in Massachusetts because Rhode Island law did not include any direct 
impediments.159 
Rhode Island’s apparently welcoming environment was exactly 
the opportunity that Ms. Chambers and Ms. Ormiston seized. They 
were Rhode Island residents who had entered into a valid marriage in 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
connection between these criteria and the principles underlying the American Law 
Institute’s most recent statement on the law of family dissolution. Id. at 974-75. The 
bonds children form with the adults who care for them are important, and must be 
protected under the limited circumstances all authorities seem to embrace. Id. at 975. 
 154. Id. at 966. Rhode Island adopted a hybrid version of the Uniform Law on 
Paternity. Id. (citing P.L. 1979, ch. 185 §2). 
 155. Id. 
 156. Id. at 977. 
 157. 935 A.2d 956 (R.I. 2007). 
157.935 A.2d 956 (R.I. 2007). 
 158. Rhode Island, NATIONALATLAS.GOV,  
http://www.nationalatlas.gov/printable/images/pdf/reference/pagegen_ri.pdf (last  
accessed June 12, 2013). 
 159. Cote-Whitacre v. Dep’t of Pub. Health, 844 N.E.2d 623, 659 (Mass. 2006). 
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Massachusetts.160 When their relationship soured, they sought a divorce 
in the Rhode Island Family Court.161 Neither of them contested the 
validity of the marriage itself;162 nevertheless, the Chief Judge of the 
Family Court certified a question to the Rhode Island Supreme Court 
asking if the Family Court, a statutorily created court of limited 
jurisdiction, had subject matter jurisdiction to divorce a same-sex 
couple.163 A majority on the Rhode Island Supreme Court responded by 
framing the question as what “marriage” meant in 1961, the year that 
legislation creating the Family Court was enacted.164 With the question 
thus framed, it obviously answered itself—same-sex marriage had 
certainly not been within the legislature’s contemplation in 1961. 
The majority provided support for this unremarkable conclusion 
by first citing dictionary definitions from the early 1960s. 165  All 
defined “marriage” as the union of one man and one woman.166 Then, 
in what might be considered punctilious overkill, the court cited 
authority for the use of dictionary definitions and distinguished judicial 
criticism of such an approach. It also pointed out that other statutes 
used “gendered terms” when referring to different “aspects of 
marriage.”167 Finally, like a judicial version of “the lady who doth 
protest too much,”168 the court noted at some length that its conclusion 
would be the same even if the statutory authority for the Family Court 
were ambiguous.169 Thus, the majority washed its hands of the matter; 
there was no marriage, so the Family Court could grant no divorce. 
The dissenting justices first pointed out that, dictionary 
definitions notwithstanding, the lesbian couple had gone to the Family 
Court with a valid marriage license issued by a sister state.170 The court 
did not need to recognize same-sex marriages generally, the dissent 
opined, in order to grant a divorce.171 After all, a bigamous couple or an 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
 160. Chambers, 935 A.2d at 958. 
 161. Id. at 959. 
 162. Id. at 967. 
 163. Id. at 959. 
 164. Id. at 963. 
 165. Id. at 962. 
 166. Id. 
 167. Id. at 962 n.13. 
 168. WILLIAM SHAKESPEARE, HAMLET, act 3, sc.3 (with apologies to William 
Shakespeare). 
 169. Chambers, 935 A.2d at 963. 
 170. Id. at 967. 
 171. Id. at 968. 
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incestuous couple was entitled to a divorce in the Family Court even 
though both types of marriages were explicitly rendered void by statute 
in Rhode Island. 172  Finally, the dissent attempted to move the 
conversation beyond the majority’s narrow focus. The majority’s 
conclusion, it notes, is contrary to the court’s own precedent set in 
Rubano v. DiCenzo.173 Rubano extended the definition of a “family” 
for purposes of family court jurisdiction to the same-sex parents of a 
child by examining the bond between each adult and the child,174 rather 
than by focusing on the adults’ gender. Furthermore, the dissenters 
noted, to rule as the majority had ruled was to leave “people”—the 
dissent does not say “same-sex couples”—in limbo, “unable to 
extricate themselves from a legal relationship they no longer find 
congenial.”175 The missing linchpin seems to be the absence of a child. 
This linchpin was present in the 2007 Beth R. ruling, which 
permitted the divorce of a same-sex couple in New York before same-
sex marriage was legalized in 2011. Despite the similarities between 
the legal zeitgeist in Rhode Island and in New York at that point in 
time, and the similarities between the cases themselves, Beth R. was 
strikingly different from Chambers on a pivotal point; Beth R. involved 
not only the legal status of two adults, but the welfare of two young 
children who regarded both women as their parents. Analogizing to 
cases involving separate opposite-sex couples, the court noted that a 
man who has functioned as a parent could not escape parental 
obligations if he belatedly discovers he is not the biological father of 
the children in question. 176  Indeed, once the man has assumed a 
parental role, he is estopped from raising the issue of paternity at all. 
To allow him to do so would risk pervasive “damage to the child’s 
psyche,”177 as well as specific emotional and financial harm. Logically, 
then, if a man who has functioned as a parent cannot use an estoppel 
theory to avoid support obligations, he should be able to use estoppel 
theory to prevent the children’s mother from cutting off his relationship 
with children who have considered him their parent.178 The same risk 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
 172. Chambers, 935 A.2d at 972. 
 173. 759 A.2d 959 (R.I. 2000); see also supra notes 20-23 and accompanying text. 
 174. Id. at 975. 
 175. Chambers, 935 A.2d at 973. 
 176. Beth R. v. Donna M., 853 N.Y.S.2d 501, 507 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2008) (comparing 
Matter of Shondel J. v. Mark D., 7 N.Y.3d 320 (2006)). 
 177. Id. 
 178. Id. at 508. 
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of harm to the children would result. In short, in defining a parent, the 
best interests of the child must control. Applying this theory to the case 
at hand, the court easily concluded that Beth R. has been one of the 
children’s parents, since they were born and will continue to be so after 
a divorce.179 The court stressed that this conclusion was consistent with 
the overarching social purpose of marriage, and so compelled 
recognition of the couple’s marriage and thus same-sex divorce.180 The 
need to protect the welfare of children has invoked the highest purpose 
of marriage and divorce, and moved the conversation well beyond the 
gender of the adults involved. 
A recent New Jersey case underscores the impact precedent 
focusing on the welfare of children with same-sex parents can have on 
recognition of same-sex marriage and, by implication, divorce. In In re 
Parentage of Robinson,181 a child was born to a lesbian couple as a 
result of artificial insemination. Prior to the child’s birth, the couple 
filed a complaint in an effort to establish joint maternity. The plaintiff 
couple argued that the benefits of having two legal parents were 
consistent with the security and best interests of any child.182 The 
plaintiffs also pointed out that their position was entirely consistent 
with New Jersey public policy.183 In response, the state simply asserted 
that the New Jersey Artificial Insemination Statute184 used the word 
“paternity,” which, it claimed, obviously excluded “maternity.”185 
The state’s simplistic response was simply fodder for the court. It 
reviewed thirty years of precedent to pinpoint a “revolution” in the 
laws determining parentage and then traced key steps in the movement 
toward the present. 186  The current “dynamic times,” the court 
concluded, required sensitivity to the creation of new and changing 
family structures.187 Both women were mothers to the child, declared 
so in order made nunc pro tunc, effective on the date of the child’s 
birth.188 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
 179. Id. at 509. 
 180. Id. 
 181. In re Parentage of Robinson, 890 A.2d 1036 (N.J. 2005). 
 182. Id. 
 183. Id. 
 184. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 9:17-44 (West 1983). 
 185. Id. 
 186. In re Parentage of Robinson, 890 A.2d at 1039. 
 187. Id. at 1040. 
 188. Id. at 1042. 
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Seven years later, in Garden State Equality v. Dow,189 New Jersey 
law took a definitive step down the evolutionary road New York had 
followed.190 The court was called upon to address the wider and more 
nuanced question of the impact of New Jersey’s civil union law on 
same-sex parents and their children. In Garden State Equality, seven 
same-sex couples and ten of their children argued that although the 
civil union act was intended to provide rights to same-sex families and, 
in fact did inherently disadvantaged those same families.191 It failed to 
provide all the rights of marriage by depriving same-sex couples the 
designation of marriage, and the societal respect marriage implies.192 
Although New Jersey’s civil union law purports to provide equal rights 
to same-sex couples, permitting the title of “civil union,” rather than 
“marriage,” evokes the separate-but-equal injustice born from Jim 
Crow America. The state countered by simply relying on the argument 
that heterosexual marriage represented tradition.193 
The court made quick work of the tradition argument. It traced 
societal developments over the last forty years to show the changes in 
society’s views of marriage, and particularly of the roles of men and 
women. It noted, further, that “in the not too distant past” marriages 
between members of different races were banned, and that although 
society once viewed the limited opportunities afforded to women as 
appropriate and traditional, neither view would be acceptable today.194 
Analogizing to these outdated limitations on marriage, the court 
concluded that the separate system of civil union and the exclusion of 
same-sex couples violated equal protection.195 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
 189. No. MER-L-1729-11, 2012 WL 540608 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div. Feb. 21, 
2012). 
 190. This was in spite of Governor Chris Christie’s veto of a bill on Feb. 17, 2012, 
which would have legalized same-sex marriage in New Jersey. Kate Zernike, Christie 
Keeps His Promise to Veto Gay Marriage Bill, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 17, 2012, at A19, 
available at  
http://www.nytimes.com/2012/02/18/nyregion/christie-vetoes-gay-marriage-bill.html. 
 191. Id. 
 192. Garden State Equality, 2012 WL 540608 at 8-9. 
 193. Id. at 9. The plaintiffs lost a summary judgment motion filed by the court, but 
their motion for reconsideration was granted. Id. at 2. 
 194. Id. at 5. 
 195. See Kim Forde-Mazrui, Tradition as Justification: The Case of Opposite-Sex 
Marriage, 78 U. CHI. L. REV. 281 (2011) (an interesting and comprehensive analysis 
on the use of “tradition” as reason for suspicion when justifying laws being challenged 
on equal protection grounds). 
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IV. CONCLUSION 
If the process of writing this article has demonstrated anything to 
me, it is that the train—figuratively speaking—has left the station. 
Same-sex couples are increasingly able to avail themselves of the 
social respect of entering a true marriage. Should circumstances 
require, they can, increasingly, protect themselves and their children 
through divorce. These social changes are being implemented at a rate, 
and with a nuanced sophistication, that was inconceivable as recently 
as 2009. Furthermore, for those who may mourn the loss of “tradition,” 
it is well to remember that political entities are fickle. Individuals in 
power may find themselves out of power, disrespected, and disfavored 
in the blink of an eye. It is simply good sense to distribute rights and 
privileges among all men and women of good will. 
 
